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Summary
The threat of terrorism and high-profile disease outbreaks has drawn attention to public health surveillance systems for early
detection of outbreaks. State and local health departments are enhancing existing surveillance systems and developing new systems
to better detect outbreaks through public health surveillance. However, information is limited about the usefulness of surveillance
systems for outbreak detection or the best ways to support this function. This report supplements previous guidelines for evaluating
public health surveillance systems. Use of this framework is intended to improve decision-making regarding the implementation
of surveillance for outbreak detection. Use of a standardized evaluation methodology, including description of system design and
operation, also will enhance the exchange of information regarding methods to improve early detection of outbreaks. The frame-
work directs particular attention to the measurement of timeliness and validity for outbreak detection. The evaluation framework
is designed to support assessment and description of all surveillance approaches to early detection, whether through traditional
disease reporting, specialized analytic routines for aberration detection, or surveillance using early indicators of disease outbreaks,
such as syndromic surveillance.
Introduction
Public health surveillance is the ongoing, systematic collec-
tion, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of data about
a health-related event for use in public health action to reduce
morbidity and mortality and to improve health (1). Surveil-
lance serves at least eight public health functions. These
include supporting case detection and public health interven-
tions, estimating the impact of a disease or injury, portraying
the natural history of a health condition, determining the dis-
tribution and spread of illness, generating hypotheses and
stimulating research, evaluating prevention and control
measures, and facilitating planning (2). Another important
public health function of surveillance is outbreak detection
(i.e., identifying an increase in frequency of disease above the
background occurrence of the disease).
Outbreaks typically have been recognized either based on
accumulated case reports of reportable diseases or by clini-
cians and laboratorians who alert public health officials about
clusters of diseases. Because of the threat of terrorism and the
increasing availability of electronic health data, enhancements
are being made to existing surveillance systems, and new sur-
veillance systems have been developed and implemented in
public health jurisdictions with the goal of early and com-
plete detection of outbreaks (3). The usefulness of surveil-
lance systems for early detection and response to outbreaks
has not been established, and substantial costs can be incurred
in developing or enhancing and managing these surveillance
systems and investigating false alarms (4). The measurement
of the performance of public health surveillance systems for
outbreak detection is needed to establish the relative value of
different approaches and to provide information needed to
improve their efficacy for detection of outbreaks at the
earliest stages.
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This report supplements existing CDC guidelines for evalu-
ating public health surveillance systems (1). Specifically, the
report provides a framework to evaluate timeliness for out-
break detection and the balance among sensitivity, predictive
value positive (PVP), and predictive value negative (PVN) for
detecting outbreaks. This framework also encourages detailed
description of system design and operations and of their
experience with outbreak detection.
The framework is best applied to systems that have data to
demonstrate the attributes of the system under consideration.
Nonetheless, this framework also can be applied to systems
that are in early stages of development or in the planning phase
by using citations from the published literature to support
conclusions. Ideally, the evaluation should compare the per-
formance of the surveillance system under scrutiny to alterna-
tive surveillance systems and produce an assessment of the
relative usefulness for early detection of outbreaks.
Background
Early detection of outbreaks can be achieved in three ways:
1) by timely and complete receipt, review, and investigation
of disease case reports, including the prompt recognition and
reporting to or consultation with health departments by phy-
sicians, health-care facilities, and laboratories consistent with
disease reporting laws or regulations; 2) by improving the abil-
ity to recognize patterns indicative of a possible outbreak early
in its course, such as through analytic tools that improve the
predictive value of data at an early stage of an outbreak or by
lowering the threshold for investigating possible outbreaks;
and 3) through receipt of new types of data that can signify an
outbreak earlier in its course. These new types of data might
include health-care product purchases, absences from work
or school, presenting symptoms to a health-care provider, or
laboratory test orders (5).
Disease Case Reports
The foundation of communicable disease surveillance in
the United States is the state and local application of the
reportable disease surveillance system known as the National
Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS), which
includes the listing of diseases and laboratory findings of public
health interest, the publication of case definitions for their
surveillance, and a system for passing case reports from local
to state to CDC. This process occurs best where two-way com-
munication occurs between public health agencies and the
clinical community: clinicians and laboratories report cases
and clusters of reportable and unusual diseases, and health
departments consult on case diagnosis and management, alerts,
surveillance summaries, and clinical and public health rec-
ommendations and policies. Faster, more specific and afford-
able diagnostic methods and decision-support tools for diseases
with substantial outbreak potential could improve the timely
recognition of reportable diseases. On-going health-care pro-
vider and laboratory outreach, education, and 24-hour access
to public health professionals are needed to enhance report-
ing of urgent health threats. Electronic laboratory reporting
(i.e., the automated transfer of designated data from a labora-
tory database to a public health data repository using a
defined message structure) also will improve the timeliness
and completeness of reporting notifiable conditions (6–8) and
can serve as a model for electronic reporting of a wider range
of clinical information. A comprehensive surveillance effort
supports timely investigation (i.e., tracking of cases once an
outbreak has been recognized) and data needs for managing
the public health response to an outbreak or terrorist event.
Pattern Recognition
Statistical tools for pattern recognition and aberration
detection can be applied to screen data for patterns warrant-
ing further public health investigation and to enhance recog-
nition of subtle or obscure outbreak patterns (9). Automated
analysis and visualization tools can lessen the need for
frequent and intensive manual analysis of surveillance data.
New Data Types
Many new surveillance systems, loosely termed syndromic
surveillance systems, use data that are not diagnostic of a dis-
ease but that might indicate the early stages of an outbreak.
The scope of this framework is broader than these novel sys-
tems, yet the wide-ranging definitions and expectations of
syndromic surveillance require clarification. Syndromic sur-
veillance for early outbreak detection is an investigational
approach where health department staff, assisted by automated
data acquisition and generation of statistical signals, monitor
disease indicators continually (real-time) or at least daily (near
real-time) to detect outbreaks of diseases earlier and more com-
pletely than might otherwise be possible with traditional public
health methods (e.g., by reportable disease surveillance and
telephone consultation). The distinguishing characteristic of
syndromic surveillance is the use of indicator data types. For
example, a laboratory is a data source that can support tradi-
tional disease case reporting by submitting reports of confir-
matory laboratory results for notifiable conditions; however,
test requests are a type of laboratory data that might be used
as an outbreak indicator by tracking excess volume of test
requests for diseases that typically cause outbreaks. New data
types have been used by public health to enhance
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surveillance, reflecting events that might precede a clinical
diagnosis (e.g., patient’s chief complaints in emergency de-
partments, clinical impressions on ambulance log sheets, pre-
scriptions filled, retail drug and product purchases, school or
work absenteeism, and constellations of medical signs and
symptoms in persons seen in various clinical settings).
Outbreak detection is the overriding purpose of syndromic
surveillance for terrorism preparedness. Enhanced case-
finding and monitoring the course and population character-
istics of a recognized outbreak also are potential benefits of
syndromic surveillance (4). A manual syndromic surveillance
system was used to detect additional anthrax cases in the fall
of 2001 when the outbreak was recognized (10). Complicat-
ing the understanding of syndromic surveillance is that syn-
dromes have been used for case detection and management of
diseases when the condition is infrequent and the syndrome
is relatively specific for the condition of interest. Acute flaccid
paralysis is a syndromic marker for poliomyelitis and is used
to detect single cases of suspected polio in a timely way to
initiate investigation and control measures. In this case, the
syndrome is relatively uncommon and serious and serves as a
proxy for polio (11). Syndromes also have been used effec-
tively for surveillance in resource-poor settings for sexually
transmitted disease detection and control where laboratory
confirmation is not possible or practical (12). However,
syndromic surveillance for terrorism is not intended for early
detection of single cases or limited outbreaks because the early
clinical manifestations of diseases that might be caused by
terrorism are common and nonspecific (13).
Framework
This framework is intended to support the evaluation of all
public health surveillance systems for the timely detection of
outbreaks. The framework is organized into four categories:
system description, outbreak detection, experience, and con-
clusions and recommendations. A comprehensive evaluation
will address all four categories.
A. System Description
1. Purpose. The purpose(s) of the system should be explic-
itly and clearly described and should include the intended
uses of the system. The evaluation methods might be priori-
tized differently for different purposes. For example, if terror-
ism is expected to be rare, reassurance might be the primary
purpose of the terrorism surveillance system. However, for
reassurance to be credible, negative results must be accurate
and the system should have a demonstrated ability to detect
outbreaks of the kind and size being dismissed.
The description of purpose should include the indications
for implementing the system; whether the system is designed
for short-term, high-risk situations or long-term, continuous
use; the context in which the system operates (whether it stands
alone or augments data from other surveillance systems); what
type of outbreaks the system is intended to detect; and what
secondary functional value is desired. Designers of the system
should specify the desired sensitivity and specificity of the sys-
tem and whether it is intended to capture small or large events.
2. Stakeholders. The stakeholders of the system should be
listed. Stakeholders include those who provide data for the
system and those who use the information generated by the
system (e.g., public health practitioners; health-care provid-
ers; other health-related data providers; public safety officials;
government officials at local, state, and federal levels; com-
munity residents; nongovernmental organizations; and com-
mercial systems developers). The stakeholders might vary
among different systems and might change as conditions
change. Listing stakeholders helps define who the system is
intended to serve and provides context for the evaluation
results.
3. Operation. All aspects of the operation of the syndromic
surveillance system should be described in detail to allow stake-
holders to validate the description of the system and for other
interested parties to understand the complexity and resources
needed to operate such a system. Detailed system description
also will facilitate evaluation by highlighting variations in sys-
tem operation that are relevant to variations in system perfor-
mance (Figure 1). Such a conceptual model can facilitate the
description of the system. The description of the surveillance
process should address 1) systemwide characteristics (data flow
[Figure 2]), including data and transmission standards to
facilitate interoperability and data sharing between informa-
tion systems, security, privacy, and confidentiality; 2) data
sources (used broadly in this framework to include the data-
producing facility [i.e., the entity sharing data with the public
health surveillance system], the data type [e.g., chief complaint,
discharge diagnosis, laboratory test order], and the data for-
mat [e.g., electronic or paper, text descriptions of events or
illnesses, or structured data reworded or stored in standard-
ized format]); 3) data processing before analysis (the data col-
lation, filtering, transformation, and routing functions required
for public health to use the data, including the classification
and assigning of syndromes); 4) statistical analysis (tools for
automated screening of data for potential outbreaks); and
5) epidemiologic analysis, interpretation, and investigation (the
rules, procedures, and tools that support decision-making in
response to a system signal, including adequate staffing with
trained epidemiologists who can review, explore, and inter-
pret the data in a timely manner).
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B. Outbreak Detection
The ability of a system to reliably detect an outbreak at the
earliest possible stage depends on the timely capture and pro-
cessing of the data produced by transactions of health behav-
iors (e.g., over-the-counter pharmaceutical sales, emergency
department visits, and nurse call-line volume) or health-care
activities (e.g., laboratory test volume and triage categoriza-
tion of chief complaint) that might indicate an outbreak; the
validity of the data for measuring the conditions of interest at
the earliest stage of illness and the quality of those data; and
the detection methods applied to these processed surveillance
data to distinguish expected events from those indicative of
an outbreak.
1. Timeliness. The timeliness of surveillance approaches
for outbreak detection is measured by the lapse of time from
exposure to the disease agent to the initiation of a public health
intervention. A timeline with interim milestones is proposed
to improve the specificity of timeliness measures (Figure 3).
Although measuring all of the time points that define the
intervals might be impractical or inexact in an applied out-
break setting, measuring intervals in a consistent way can be
used to compare alternative outbreak-detection approaches
and specific surveillance systems.
• Onset of exposure: By anchor-
ing the timeline on exposure, the
timeliness advantage of different
data sources can be assessed and
compared. Exposure can most
easily be estimated in a point-
source outbreak. Time of exposure
is often inferred from knowledge
of the agent (e.g., incubation
period) and the epidemiology of
the outbreak.
• Onset of symptoms: The
interval to symptom onset in each
case is defined by the incubation
period for the agent. Time of
symptom onset might be esti-
mated using case interviews or
existing knowledge of the agent
and the time of exposure. The
incubation period might vary
according to host factors and the
route and dose of the exposure.
• Onset of behavior: Following symptom onset, several
health behaviors can occur (e.g., purchasing over-the-
counter medication from a store, calling in sick to work,
or visiting an urgent-care center). When an affected per-
son interacts with the health-care system, a variety of
health-care provider behaviors might be performed (e.g.,
order of a laboratory test and admission to a hospital).
The selection of data sources for a system has a strong
influence on timeliness. Some of those experiencing symp-
toms will initiate a health behavior or stimulate a health-
care provider behavior that is a necessary step to being
captured in the surveillance system.
• Capture of data: The timing of the capture of a behavior
by the data-providing facility varies by data type and can
be influenced by system design. A retail purchase might
be entered in an electronic database at the moment the
transaction is completed, or a record might not be generated
in a clinical setting until hours after health care was sought.
• Completion of data processing: Time is required for the
facility providing the data to process the data and
produce the files needed for public health. Records might
be transmitted to a central repository only periodically
(e.g., weekly). Data form can influence processing time
(e.g., transcription from paper to electronic form and
coding text-based data), and data manipulations needed
to de-identify data and prepare necessary files can affect
processing time.
FIGURE 1. Process model for early outbreak detection
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• Capture of data in public health surveillance system:
The time required to transfer data from the data provid-
ing facility to the public health entity varies according to
the frequency established for routine data transmission
and by the data transmission method (e.g., Internet, mail,
or courier).
• Application of pattern recognition tools/algorithms:
Before analytic tools can be applied to the data in the
surveillance system, certain processing steps are necessary
(e.g., categorization into syndrome categories, application
of case definition, and data transformations).
• Generation of automated alert: The detection algorithm’s
alerting interval is a product of how often the algorithm
is run and a report generated and the capacity of the algo-
rithm to filter noise and detect an aberration as early as
possible in the course of the outbreak.
• Initiation of public health investigation: The initiation
of a public health investigation occurs when a decision is
made to acquire additional data. Analysis and judgment
are applied by public health-care providers to the pro-
cessed surveillance data and other available information
to decide whether new data collection is warranted to con-
firm the existence of an outbreak. The challenge of inter-
preting data from multiple surveillance systems could
diminish potential advantages in timeliness. The focus on
outbreak detection allows for investigations of potential
outbreaks to proceed before a specific clinical diagnosis is
obtained.
• Initiation of public health
intervention: When an outbreak
of public health significance is
confirmed, interventions can be
implemented to control the sever-
ity of disease and prevent further
spread. Interventions might be of
a general nature directed to the
recognition of an outbreak (e.g.,
apply respiratory infection pre-
cautions and obtain clinical speci-
mens for diagnosis) or can be
specific to the diagnosis (e.g.,
antibiotic prophylaxis or vaccina-
tion).
2. Validity. Measuring the
validity of a system for outbreak
detection requires an operational
definition of an outbreak.
Although a statistical deviation
from a baseline rate can be useful for triggering further inves-
tigation, it is not sufficient for defining an outbreak. In prac-
tice, the confirmation of an outbreak is a judgment that
depends on past experience with the condition, the severity of
the condition, the communicability of the condition, confi-
dence in the diagnosis of the condition, public health con-
cern about outbreaks at the time, having options for effective
prevention or control, and the resources required and avail-
able to respond. Operationally, an outbreak is defined by the
affected public health jurisdiction when the occurrence of a
condition has changed sufficiently to warrant public health
attention.
The validity of a surveillance system for outbreak detection
varies according to the outbreak scenario and surveillance sys-
tem factors. These factors can confound the comparison of
systems and must be carefully described in the evaluation. For
example, the minimum size of an outbreak that can be
detected by a system cannot be objectively compared among
systems unless they are identical or differences are accounted
for in several ways.
• Case definitions: Establish the specificity and sensitivity
for the condition of interest on the basis of the data source,
data type, and response criteria.
• Baseline estimation: Determine the stability of the back-
ground occurrence of cases. Estimations are affected by
factors such as population size and geographic distribu-
tion. The performance of detection algorithms will vary
by the quality and duration and inherent variability of
baseline data.
FIGURE 2. Prototypical surveillance data flow chart for emergency department encounters
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• Reporting delays: Result in incomplete data, introduc-
ing bias that will diminish the performance of detection
algorithms.
• Data characteristics: Includes underlying patterns in the
data (e.g., seasonal variation) and systematic errors inher-
ent in the data (e.g., product sales that influence purchas-
ing behaviors unrelated to illness).
• Outbreak characteristics: Results from agent, host, and
environmental factors that affect the epidemiology of the
outbreak. For example, a large aerosol exposure with an
agent causing serious disease in a highly susceptible popu-
lation will have different detection potential than an out-
break of similar size spread person-to-person over a longer
time and dispersed distribution.
• Statistical analysis: Defines how data are screened for
outbreak detection. Detection algorithms have different
performance characteristics under different outbreak con-
ditions.
• Epidemiologic analysis, interpretation, and investiga-
tion: The procedures, resources, and tools for analysis,
interpretation, and response that can substantially affect
the ability to detect and respond to outbreaks.
Validation Approaches
Different approaches to outbreak detection need to be evalu-
ated under the same conditions to isolate the unique features
of the system (e.g., data type) from the outbreak characteris-
tics and the health department capacity. The data needed to
evaluate and compare the performance of surveillance systems
for early outbreak detection can be obtained from naturally
occurring outbreaks or through simulation.
Controlled comparisons of sur-
veillance systems for detection of
deliberately induced outbreaks
will be difficult because of the
infrequency of such outbreaks
and the diversity of systems and
outbreak settings. However,
understanding the value of differ-
ent surveillance approaches to
early detection will increase as
descriptions of their experience
with detecting and missing natu-
rally occurring outbreaks accu-
mulate. Accumulation of
experience descriptions is made
more difficult by not having stan-
dard methods for measuring out-
break detection successes and
failures across systems and by the diversity of surveillance sys-
tem and outbreak factors that influence performance. Stan-
dardized classification of system and outbreak factors will
enable comparison of experiences across systems. Pending the
development of classification standards, descriptive evaluation
should include as much detail as possible. Proxy outbreak sce-
narios reflect the types of naturally occurring outbreaks that
should not be missed to instill confidence in the ability of
these systems to detect outbreaks caused by terrorism.
Examples of proxy events or outbreaks include seasonal events
(e.g., increases in influenza, norovirus gastroenteritis, and other
infectious respiratory agents) and community outbreaks (e.g.,
foodborne, waterborne, hepatitis A, child-care–associated
shigellosis, legionellosis, and coccidioidomycosis and histo-
plasmosis in areas where the diseases are endemic).
The measurement of outbreaks detected, false alarms, and
outbreaks missed or detected late should be designed as a rou-
tine part any system workflow and conducted with minimal
effort or complexity. Routine reporting should be automated
where possible. Relevant information needs include: the num-
ber of statistical aberrations detected at a set threshold in a
defined period of time (e.g., frequency per month at a given
p-value); the action taken as a result of the signals (e.g.,
review for data errors, in-depth follow-up analysis of the spe-
cific conditions within the syndrome category, manual epide-
miologic analysis to characterize a signal, examining data from
other systems, and increasing the frequency of
reporting from affected sites); resources directed to the fol-
low-up of the alert; public health response that resulted (e.g.,
an alert to clinicians, timely dissemination of information to
other health entities, a vaccination campaign, or no further
FIGURE 3. Timeline milestones for early outbreak detection
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response); documentation of how every recognized outbreak
in the jurisdiction was detected; an assessment of the value of
the follow-up effort (e.g., the effort was an appropriate
application of public health resources); a detailed description
of the agent, host, and environmental conditions of the out-
break; and the number of outbreaks detected only late in their
course or in retrospect.
To evaluate the relative value of different methods for out-
break detection, a direct comparison approach is needed. For
example, if a health department detects a substantial number
of its outbreaks through telephone consultations, then a phone
call tracking system might produce the data needed to com-
pare telephone consults with other approaches for early
detection of outbreaks.
As an alternative to naturally occurring outbreaks, simula-
tions can allow for the control and modification of agent, host,
and environmental factors to study system performance across
a range of common scenarios. However, simulations are lim-
ited in their ability to mimic the diversity and unpredictability
of real-life events. Whenever possible, simulated outbreaks
should be superimposed on historical trend data. To evaluate
detection algorithms comparatively, a shared challenge prob-
lem and data set would be helpful. Simulation is limited by
the availability of well-documented outbreak scenarios (e.g.,
organism or agent characteristics, transmission characteristics,
and population characteristics). Simulations should incorpo-
rate data for each of the factors described previously. Multiple
simulation runs should be used to test algorithm performance
in different outbreak scenarios, allowing for generation of
operating characteristic curves that reflect performance in a
range of conditions.
Focused studies to validate the performance of limited
aspects of systems (e.g., data sources, case definitions, statisti-
cal methods, and timeliness of reporting) can provide indirect
evidence of system performance. Component studies also can
test assumptions about outbreak scenarios and support better
data simulation. Syndrome case definitions for certain spe-
cific data sources need to be validated. Component validation
studies should emphasize outbreak detection over case detec-
tion. These studies contain explicit hypotheses and research
questions and should be shared in a manner to advance the
development of outbreak detection systems without unneces-
sary duplication.
Statistical Assessment of Validity
Surveillance systems must balance the risk for an outbreak,
the value of early intervention, and the finite resources for
investigation. Perceived high risk and high value of timely
detection support high sensitivity and low thresholds for
investigation. A low threshold can prompt resource-intensive
investigations and occupy vital staff, and a high threshold
might delay detection and intervention. The perceived threat
of an outbreak, the community value attached to early detec-
tion, and the investigation resources available might vary over
time. As a result, specifying a fixed relation between optimal
sensitivity and predictive value for purposes of evaluation might
be difficult.
The sensitivity and PVP and PVN are closely linked and
considered together in this framework. Sensitivity is the per-
centage of outbreaks occurring in the jurisdiction detected by
the system. PVP reflects the probability of a system signal
being an outbreak. PVN reflects the probability that no out-
break is occurring when the system does not yield a signal.
The calculation of sensitivity and predictive value is described
in detail in the updated guidelines for evaluating public health
surveillance systems (1). Measurement of sensitivity requires
an alternative data source of high quality (e.g., “gold” stan-
dard) to confirm outbreaks in the population that were missed
by the surveillance system. Sensitivity for outbreak detection
could be assessed through capture-recapture techniques with
two independent data sources (14). The high costs associated
with responding to false alarms and with delayed response to
outbreaks demand efforts to quantify and limit the impact of
both. As long as the likelihood of terrorism is extremely low,
PVP will remain near zero and a certain level of nonterrorism
signals will be a necessary part of conducting surveillance for
the detection of terrorism. Better performance can be achieved
in one attribute (e.g., sensitivity) without a performance dec-
rement in another (e.g., PVP) by changing the system (e.g.,
adding a data type or applying a better detection algorithm).
Improving sensitivity by lowering the cut-off for signaling an
outbreak will reduce PVP. Sensitivity and PVP for these sur-
veillance systems will ultimately be calibrated in each system
to balance the secondary benefits (e.g., detection of naturally
occurring outbreaks, disease case finding and management,
reassurance of no outbreak during periods of heightened risk,
and a stronger reporting and consultation relation between
public health and clinical medicine) with the locally accept-
able level of false alarms.
Data Quality
The validity of syndromic surveillance system data is
dependent on data quality. Error-prone systems and data prone
to inaccurate measurement can negatively affect detection of
unusual trends. Although data quality might be a less critical
problem for screening common, nonspecific indicators for sta-
tistical aberrations, quality should be evaluated and improved
to the extent possible. Measuring data quality is dependent
on a standard (e.g., medical record review or fabricated test
data with values known to the evaluator). The updated
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guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems
(1) describe data quality in additional detail.
• Representativeness: When case ascertainment within a
population is incomplete (e.g., in a sentinel system or a
statistically based sample), representativeness reflects
whether a system accurately describes the distribution of
cases by time, place, and person. Geographic representa-
tiveness is particularly important for detecting outbreaks
of infectious diseases.
• Completeness of data: The frequency of unknown or
blank responses to data items in the system can be used to
measure the level of completeness. For systems that
update data from previous transmissions, time should be
factored into measurement by indicating the percentage
of records that are complete (i.e., all variables are cap-
tured for a record) on initial report and within an appro-
priate interval (e.g., 48 hours) of submission. Sites with
substantial reporting delays can be flagged for reliability
concerns and targeted for improvement. Incomplete data
can require follow-up before analysis, with associated
decreases in timeliness and increase in cost. When mul-
tiple data providers contribute to a common data store
for statistical analysis, the percentage of reporting sources
that submit their data on a routine interval (e.g., every 24
hours) conveys the completeness of the aggregate data-
base for routine analysis. Evaluation of completeness
should include a description of the problems experienced
with manual data management (e.g., coding errors or loss
of data) and the problems with automated data manage-
ment (e.g., programming errors or inappropriate filtering
of data).
C. System Experience
The performance attributes described in this section
convey the experience that has accrued in using the system.
1. System usefulness. A surveillance system is useful for
outbreak detection depending on its contribution to the early
detection of outbreaks of public health significance that leads
to an effective intervention. An assessment of usefulness goes
beyond detection to address the impact or value added by its
application. Measurement of usefulness is inexact. As with
validity, measurement will benefit from common terminol-
ogy and standard data elements. In the interim, detailed
efforts to describe and illustrate the consequences of early
detection efforts will improve understanding of their
usefulness.
Evaluation should begin with a review of the objectives of
the system and should consider the priorities. To the extent
possible, usefulness should be described by the disease
prevention and control actions taken as a result of the analysis
and interpretation of the data from the system.
The impact of the surveillance system should be contrasted
with other mechanisms available for outbreak detection. An
assessment of usefulness should list the outbreaks detected and
the role that different methods played in the identification of
each one. Examples of how the system has been used to detect
or track health problems other than outbreaks in the commu-
nity should be included. The public health response to the
outbreaks and health problems detected should be described
as well as how data from new or modified surveillance sys-
tems support inferences about disease patterns that would not
be possible without them.
Surveillance systems for early outbreak detection are some-
times justified for the reassurance they provide when aberrant
patterns are not apparent during a heightened risk period or
when the incidence of cases declines during an outbreak. When
community reassurance is claimed as a benefit of the surveil-
lance system, reassurance should be defined and the measure-
ment quantified (e.g., number of phone calls from the public
on a health department hotline, successful press conferences,
satisfaction of public health decision-makers, or resources to
institutionalize the new surveillance system). A description
should include who is reassured and of what they are reas-
sured, and reassurance should be evaluated for validity by
estimating the PVN.
2. Flexibility. The flexibility of a surveillance system refers
to the system’s ability to change as needs change. The adapta-
tion to changing detection needs or operating conditions
should occur with minimal additional time, personnel, or other
resources. Flexibility generally improves the more data pro-
cessing is handled centrally rather than distributed to indi-
vidual data-providing facilities because fewer system and
operator behavior changes are needed. Flexibility should
address the ability of the system to apply evolving data stan-
dards and code sets as reflected in Public Health Information
Network (PHIN) standards (http://www.cdc.gov/phin). Flex-
ibility includes the adaptability of the system to shift from
outbreak detection to outbreak management. The flexibility
of the system to meet changing detection needs can include
the ability to add unique data to refine signal detection, to
capture exposure and other data relevant to managing an out-
break, to add data providers to increase population coverage
and detect or track low frequency events, to modify case defi-
nitions (the aggregation of codes into syndrome groupings),
to improve the detection algorithm to filter random varia-
tions in trends more efficiently, and to adjust the detection
threshold. Flexibility also can be reflected by the ability of the
system to detect and monitor naturally occurring outbreaks
in the absence of terrorism. System flexibility is needed to
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balance the risk for an outbreak, the value of early interven-
tion, and the resources for investigation as understanding of
these factors changes.
3. System acceptability. As with the routine evaluation of
public health surveillance systems (1), the acceptability of a
surveillance system for early outbreak detection is reflected by
the willingness of participants and stakeholders to contribute
to the data collection and analysis. This concept includes the
authority and willingness to share electronic health data and
should include an assessment of the legal basis for the collec-
tion of prediagnosis data and the implications of privacy laws
(e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
Privacy Rule) (15). All states have broad disease-reporting laws
that require reporting of diseases of public health importance,
and many of these laws appear compatible with the authority
to receive syndromic surveillance data (16). The authority to
require reporting of indicator data for persons who lack evi-
dence of a reportable condition and in the absence of an emer-
gency is less clear and needs to be verified by jurisdictions.
Acceptability can vary over time as the threat level, perceived
value of early detection, support for the methods of surveil-
lance, and resources fluctuate.
Acceptability of a system can be inferred from the extent of
its adoption. Acceptability is reflected by the participation rate
of potential reporting sources, by the completeness of data
reporting, and by the timeliness of person-dependent steps in
the system (e.g., manual data entry from emergency depart-
ment logs as distinguished from electronic data from the
normal clinical workflow).
4. Portability. The portability of a surveillance system
addresses how well the system could be duplicated in another
setting. Adherence to the PHIN standards can enhance port-
ability by reducing variability in the application of informa-
tion technology between sites. Reliance on person-dependent
steps, including judgment and action criteria (e.g., for analy-
sis and interpretation) should be fully documented to improve
system portability. Portability also is influenced by the sim-
plicity of the system. Examples should be provided of the
deployment of similar systems in other settings, and the expe-
rience of those efforts should be described. In the absence of
examples, features of the system that might support or detract
from portability should be described.
5. System stability. The stability of a surveillance system
refers to its resilience to system changes (e.g., change in
coding from International Classifications of Disease, Ninth
Revision [ICD-9] to ICD-10). Stability can be demonstrated
by the duration and consistent operation of the system. Sys-
tem stability is distinguished from the reliability of data ele-
ments within the system. The consistent representation of the
condition under surveillance (reliability) is an aspect of data
quality. Stability can be measured by the frequency of system
outages or downtime for servicing during periods of need,
including downtime of data providers, the frequency of
personnel deficiencies from staff turnover, and budget con-
straints. Ongoing support by system designers and evolving
software updates might improve system stability. Stability also
can be reflected in the extent of control over costs and system
changes that the sponsoring agency maintains.
6. System costs. Cost is a vital factor in assessing the rela-
tive value of surveillance for terrorism preparedness. Cost-
effectiveness analyses and data modeling are needed under a
range of scenarios to estimate the value of innovations in sur-
veillance for outbreak detection and terrorism preparedness
(17). Improved methods of measuring cost and impact are
needed. Costs borne by data providers should be noted; how-
ever, the cost perspective should be that of the community
(societal perspective) to account for costs of prevention and
treatment born by the community.
Direct costs include the fees paid for software and data, the
personnel salary and support expenses (e.g., training, equip-
ment support, and travel), and other resources needed to
operate the system and produce information for public health
decisions (e.g. office supplies, Internet and telephone lines,
and other communication equipment). Fixed costs for run-
ning the system should be differentiated from the variable costs
of responding to system alarms. Variable costs include the cost
of follow-up activities (e.g., for diagnosis, case-management,
or community interventions). The cost of responding to false
alarms represents a variable but inherent inefficiency of an
early detection system that should be accounted for in the
evaluation. Similarly, variable costs include the financial and
public health costs of missing outbreaks entirely or recogniz-
ing them late. Costs vary because the sensitivity and timeli-
ness of the detection methods can be modified according to
changes in tolerance for missing outbreaks and for respond-
ing to false alarms. Similarly, the threshold and methods for
investigating system alarms can vary with the perceived risk
and need to respond. Costs from public health response to
false alarms with traditional surveillance systems need to be
measured in a comparable way when assessing the relative value
of new surveillance methods. Cost savings should be estimated
by assessing the impact of prevention and control efforts (e.g.,
health-care costs and productivity losses averted) Questions
to answer include the following:
• How many investigations were initiated as a result of these
data?
• What response was made and what cost was incurred
through follow-up of flagged events?
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• What were the indications for responding?
• How much staff time was required for follow-up?
• Was anxiety raised unnecessarily by false alarms?
• Was benefit obtained (e.g., through improved communi-
cation and confidence in the responsibility and perfor-
mance of public health) when false alarms were
investigated?
• Who was affected?
• What costs did partners incur in follow-up of signals
(e.g., medical record staff work and clinical staff efforts)?
Follow-up costs for false alarms should be distinguished
from costs related to investigations that uncover real
outbreaks that warrant a public health response.
• Did the health department fail to respond to a true event
because of complacency or the response burden resulting
from false alarms?
• Did late recognition of an outbreak result in unnecessary
morbidity?
• Have lessons learned from earlier events reduced costs as
the system has continued to operate?
D. Conclusions and Recommendations
for Use and Improvement of Systems
for Early Outbreak Detection
The evaluation should be summarized to convey the
strengths and weaknesses of the system under scrutiny. Sum-
marizing and reporting evaluation findings should facilitate
the comparison of systems for those making decisions about
new or existing surveillance methods. These conclusions should
be validated among stakeholders of the system and modified
accordingly. Recommendations should address adoption, con-
tinuation, or modification of the surveillance system so that it
can better achieve its intended purposes. Recommendations
should be disseminated widely and actively interpreted for all
appropriate audiences.
An Institute of Medicine study concluded that although
innovative surveillance methods might be increasingly help-
ful in the detection and monitoring of outbreaks, a balance is
needed between strengthening proven approaches (e.g., diag-
nosis of infectious illness and strengthening the liaison
between clinical-care providers and health departments) and
the exploration and evaluation of new approaches (17). Guid-
ance for the evaluation of surveillance systems for outbreak
detection is on-going. Many advances are needed in under-
standing of systems and outbreak characteristics to improve
performance metrics. For example, research is needed to
understand the personal health and clinical health care
behaviors that might serve as early indicators of priority dis-
eases; analytic methods are needed to improve pattern recog-
nition and to integrate multiple streams of data; a shared
vocabulary is needed for describing outbreak conditions, man-
aging text-based information, and supporting case definitions;
and evaluation research is needed, including cost-
effectiveness of different surveillance models for early detec-
tion, both in real-life comparisons and in simulated data
environments, to characterize the size and nature of epidem-
ics that can be detected through innovative surveillance
approaches. Pending more robust measures of system perfor-
mance, the goal of this framework is to improve public health
surveillance systems for early outbreak detection
by providing practical guidance for evaluation.
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A. System-wide Issues
❑ Describe the political, administrative, and geographic
context for the system
❑ Provide a process model that describes the data flow
of the system:
❑ Who inputs the data into the system
❑ Who can view the data
❑ Who can manipulate the data
❑ Indicate where processing occurs centrally and
where at distributed sites
❑ Indicate where steps are automated and where
manual
❑ Indicate which steps are managed on-site and
which can be done remotely
❑ Estimate the time required for each step of the
data flow
❑ Indicate whether source data are produced in the
course of routine workflow or specifically for the
purpose of syndromic surveillance
❑ Describe data and messaging standards:
❑ Identify standards used to facilitate
interoperability
❑ Identify standards used to facilitate data sharing
❑ Describe how the system interfaces with other
surveillance systems from the same sites to limit
reporting burden
❑ Cite relevant PHIN standards and ability to meet
them (http://www.cdc.gov/phin/)
❑ Provide legal documentation allowing data sharing
❑ Describe procedures to maintain security:
❑ Indicate security procedures employed for trans-
mission of data between sites and for data
management at the central repository
❑ Describe security measures to protect data integ-
rity at the central repository
❑ Cite relevant PHIN standards and ability to meet
them (http://www.cdc.gov/phin/)
❑ Describe procedures to assure privacy and confiden-
tiality:
❑ Identify the legal authority under which the
surveillance activity is being conducted
❑ Indicate the rules, procedures, and tools used
to assure privacy and confidentiality, including
methods for de-identification and re-identification,
if used, and the points in the data flow where
statistical disclosure limitation methods are
applied
B. Data Sources
❑ Describe the following:
❑ Data producing facility
❑ Data type
❑ Data format
❑ Data element definitions
❑ Code sets (e.g., International Classification of
Diseases (ICD) codes) used to describe the
response categories
❑ Data captured for geographic location (e.g.,
zipcode, geocode)
❑ Provide a data model describing the relationship
between data elements and the code sets (The archi-
tecture of the National Electronic Disease Surveillance
System (NEDSS http://www.cdc.gov/nedss/) and the
Public Health Conceptual Data Model (http://
www.cdc.gov/nedss/DataModels/phcdm.pdf ) can
serve as illustrations of comprehensive data models.)
❑ Indicate which data standards are used and
whether they are proprietary
❑ Identify the standards used for assembling data
documentation (i.e., metadata)
C. Data Preprocessing
❑ Indicate the steps taken to share data between infor-
mation systems and indicate the responsible organi-
zation for assuring each step (e.g., clinical facility, data
clearinghouse, local health department, state health
department)
❑ Indicate the frequency of data collection
❑ Indicate the volume of data (e.g., average number of
records per day)
❑ Indicate how the accumulation of data is handled
❑ Describe how different data streams or data elements
are assembled, subset, and manipulated to prepare
them for analysis
❑ Indicate whether a relational database is formed to
link datasets and the unique identifier(s) used for linkage
❑ Indicate the health-related events, syndromes, or con-
stellation of findings under surveillance, including the
derivation of the case-definitions
❑ Identify who has authority to determine the criteria
for case definitions and how case criteria are applied
to the data
❑ Provide a description of any algorithms used to
establish the status of a potential case
Appendix. Operations Checklist
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❑ Indicate the frequency of editing and updating the
electronic file
❑ Indicate how incomplete records are handled in analy-
sis and reports
❑ Describe how data archiving and disposal is managed
❑ Describe how new data sources or necessary changes
in data sources are identified and incorporated in the
system.
D. Statistical Analysis
❑ Describe how the health outcome baseline is estab-
lished:
❑ Describe the population under surveillance
❑ Describe the source, the criteria, and the meth-
ods for establishing the background frequencies
used to detect aberrations
❑ How much baseline data are managed in the
analysis database
❑ Describe analytic methods used in automated analy-
ses (i.e., aberration detection):
❑ Describe in mathematical and statistical detail the
algorithms intended to signal an event requiring
further investigation
❑ Describe adaptations in analytic methods to ac-
count for different outbreak patterns that might
be anticipated in different data sources and types
and for different outbreak scenarios
❑ Indicate how reporting delays are corrected for
in the analysis.
❑ Describe the method of adjusting results for
potential confounding factors
❑ Describe how the system adapts over time and
the empirical basis for modifications in the methods
❑ Describe the detection process:
❑ The frequency of data analysis
❑ How an alarm is generated
❑ Where the alarm goes
❑ The type of alarms generated by the system
❑ What is done to ensure that signals are not being
missed
❑ Describe the report generation process:
❑ What routine reports are generated
❑ Whether data are presented graphically or in
tables
❑ Whether data can be manipulated to get a
specific table/chart
❑ How often charts and tables are refreshed with
new data
❑ Indicate training level of personnel needed to
manage the detection methods.
E. Epidemiologic Analysis,
Interpretation, and Investigation
❑ Describe the process for managing system alarms:
❑ Describe the special procedures instituted when
the alarm is generated (e.g., review for data errors,
in-depth manual analysis of the specific condi-
tions within the syndrome category, manual
epidemiological analysis to identify subgroups
responsible for an alarm, examining data from
other systems, increasing the frequency of
reporting from affected sites)
❑ Estimate the person-hours that are devoted to
review and analysis each day and the interval at
which data are analyzed
❑ Indicate documented procedures for managing
system alarms.
❑ Indicate communication method that staff is
alerted of alarms (e.g., whether they get paged at
home, receive an automated e-mail, etc.?)
❑ Indicate the expectations and schedule of staff to
actively check the system and schedule,
including nights and weekends
❑ Indicate the response options to an alarm and
the factors that influence the choice (e.g., wait
for an alarm in another system, initiate an onsite
investigation, alert clinicians to gather information)
❑ Describe the process for identifying cases for investiga-
tion when the data analyzed routinely are unidentified
❑ Describe how independent data types are integrated
in the analysis for improved decision making
❑ Describe the rules, procedures, and tools for
communication
❑ Indicate the mechanisms used and content guid-
ance provided for sharing results with 1) reporting
sources, 2) response community, and 3) the public;
❑ Describe how decisions are made for sending
urgent communications and the methods for
sending urgent communications
❑ Indicate whether receipt of a communication is
acknowledged and how unacknowledged receipt
is managed
❑ Indicate how often urgent communications and
routine reports are sent
❑ Describe the protocol for conducting surveillance
during outbreak management, if one exists
❑ Indicate how often data will be updated and analyzed
❑ Describe how the system can be modified or
customized to meet special data needs
❑ Describe how the system will monitor the impact of
prevention and control measures
❑ Describe how and how often system components
are tested for operational readiness (e.g., ‘spiked’
data or modeling exercises)
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